The Law of Confessions as Affected by Supreme Court Decisions by unknown
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 27 Issue 3 Article 6 
1958 
The Law of Confessions as Affected by Supreme Court Decisions 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
The Law of Confessions as Affected by Supreme Court Decisions, 27 Fordham L. Rev. 396 (1958). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol27/iss3/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
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husband and wife. The court permitted the eavesdropper who used the device
to testify, stating that it made no difference whether such privileged com-
munications were obtained by one concealed nearby or by means of an electrical
device.5" It does not appear what weight such evidence had in this case, but it
is conceivable that in some cases a conviction might not be had except for
evidence procured in such a manner.
There seems little justification for retaining the anachronistic eavesdropper
exception. The manifest intention of the parties that the communication be
confidential should not be subverted by circumstances beyond their knowledge
and control.
THE LAW OF CONFESSIONS AS AFFECTED BY
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
In recent years the United States Supreme Court has reviewed a number of
state convictions in which the use in evidence of the defendant's confession
was found to be a denial of due process. Due process requires, as the Court
has phrased it, that the confession be obtained by methods fundamentally fair
to the accused. This is a stricter test of admissibility than that which the
states have traditionally applied. In state courts, for the main, the admissibility
of a confession has turned upon its credibility rather than upon abuse of the
rights of the accused. In addition the Supreme Court has held that confessions
involved in federal cases, if obtained during an unlawful delay in arraignment,
are inadmissible in federal courts.' This comment will consider the effect, if
any, which the "due process" or "fundamental fairness" test and the "delay
in arraignment" doctrine will ultimately have upon the state law of confessions.
By definition, "a confession is an acknowledgment in express words, by the
accused in a criminal case, of the truth of the guilty fact charged or of some
essential part of it."2 The law relating to the admissibility of a confession
has undergone an extensive metamorphosis in its development. Wigmore states
that there are four stages in the history of the law of confessions.3 At the
earliest stage there was no restriction at all upon their reception. Not until
the second half of the eighteenth century was it recognized that some confes-
sions are to be rejected as untrustworthy. This was the second stage. The nine-
teenth century marked the beginning of the third stage where the principle of
50. Id. at 574, 120 N.E. at 212.
1. In Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957) the Court, reversing the convic-
tion, held that a confession obtained during a 72 hour delay in arraignment was procured
in violation of Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Such evidence
unlawfully obtained is not generally admissible in federal courts. See, e.g., Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Congress reacted unfavorably to this decision and an attempt
was made to limit the delay in arraignment doctrine. See p. 400 infra.
2. 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 821 (3d ed. 1940).
3. 3 id. § 817.
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exclusion developed under certain influences to an abnormal extent and exclu-
sion became the rule and admission the exception.
Finally a trend indicating a reaction to wholesale exclusion is now arising
but, Professor Wigmore predicts, it will have little present effect upon the law.
ADmISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONS IN STATE COmTS
Confessions are admissible as competent evidence upon the logical principle
that no one would make a voluntary admission against himself unless it were
true.4 Conversely the principle of exclusion in state law is predicated upon
the untrustworthiness of such evidence under certain conditions.5 It has been
universally accepted that a confession becomes untrustworthy when it is not
voluntarily made.6 Some states apply a broad rule without attempting to define
as a matter of law any particular circumstances which would render a confession
untrustworthy.7 Most states have declared a confession inadmissible when
coercion is used upon the accused. 8 Whatever the criterion of admissibility
may be and however it may be phrased, it is safe to say that the ultimate
test is whether there has been an inducement sufficient to elicit an untrue
confession.9 A sufficient inducement may consist of physical coercion,' 0
threats,"' promises,1 2 or psychological duress.' 3 Some states have adopted
statutory definitions of inducements which exclude a confession some of which
are more liberal than the common-law rule and others more stringent.' 4 But
even in this apparent diversity the underlying concept of trustworthiness has
been the sole basis for excluding a confession rather than any wrong which
may have been inflicted upon the accused.15
4. 3 id. § 866.
5. 3 id. § 822.
6. Wilson v. State, 19 Ga. App. 759, 92 S.E. 309 (1917); State v. Novak, 109 Iowa 717,
79 N.W. 465 (1899); Parker v. State, 91 Tex. Crim. 68, 238 S.W. 943 (1922).
7. See, e.g., State v. Graffam, 202 La. 869, 13 So. 2d 249 (1943).
8. See, e.g., Simmons v. State, 206 Miss. 535, 40 So. 2d 289 (1949).
9. 3 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 2, § 831.
10. Balding v. State, 77 Okla. Crim. 36, 138 P.2d 132 (1943).
11. Harrison v. State, 152 Fla. 86, 12 So. 2d 307 (1943).
12. State v. Duran, 127 Mont. 233, 259 P.2d 1051 (1953).
13. Macon v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 363, 46 S.E.2d 396 (1948).
14. An example of such a statute is N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 395: "A confession of a
defendant, whether in the course of judicial proceedings or to a private person, can be
given in evidence against him, unless made under the influence of fear produced by threats,
or unless made upon a stipulation of the district attorney, that he shall not be prosecuted
therefor. . . ." It should be noted that the New York statute is more strict than the
common-law rule in that only a stipulation of the district attorney that he will not
prosecute is sufficient to exclude the confession. Of course such a stipulation is considered
that of the district attorney where it is made with his authority. At common law a
promise not to prosecute would exclude a confession even if made by a policeman or
persons of even lesser authority. See Watts v. State, 99 Md. 30, 57 Atl. 542 (1904);
People v. Wolcott, 51 Mich. 612, 17 N.W. 78 (1883).
15. People v. Buffom, 214 N.Y. 53, 56-57, 108 N.E. 184, 185-86 (1915).
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THE SUPREME COURT AND THE DUE PROCESS TEST
The Law Prior to Brown v. Mississippi
Supreme Court rulings with respect to confessions have also passed through
several stages. The Supreme Court's earliest treatment of confessions was
Wilson v. United States.16 There it was pointed out that trustworthiness
is the underlying test of admissibility. For a confession to be trustworthy
the Supreme Court required that it be made voluntarily. 17 Upon that basis a
confession was held inadmissible in Bram v. United States 8 where the accused
made the confession after being taken from aboard ship, held in custody and
interrogated by the police following an unlawful arrest in a foreign port. In
Ziang Sung Wan v. United States'0 a Chinese student confessed to a murder
committed in Washington, D. C. The police had apprehended him in New
York City, returned him to Washington and had interrogated him continuously
for several days without benefit of counsel, friends or relatives. The Supreme
Court reversed the conviction because it was based upon an involuntary con-
fession. The Court said, "In the federal courts, the requisite of voluntariness
is not satisfied by establishing merely that the confession was not induced
by a promise or a threat. A confession is voluntary in law if, and only if,
it was, in fact, voluntarily made." 20 Looking back upon these cases the Court
has pointed out that it formulated tests which were to govern in federal courts,
just as the states had evolved their own various tests.2 ' In this first aspect
of the doctrine the Supreme Court too considered trustworthiness the sole basis
of admissibility of a confession.
The Due Process Test
Within the past twenty-five years, however, the Supreme Court has added
further restrictions upon the admissibility of a confession. Trustworthiness
is no longer the sole consideration. It was not until 1936 in Brown v. Missis-
sippi22 that the Court had squarely before it the question of whether the
fourteenth amendment 2a was violated by state officers in obtaining a confession.
There the conviction was based solely upon a confession shown to have been
extorted by torture of the accused. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction
declaring that the use of such a confession did not measure up to that degree
of fairness imposed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
24
The Brown case marked the development of the second and, beyond a doubt,
the most far-reaching aspect of the Supreme Court doctrine. The state court's
16. 162 U.S. 613 (1896).
17. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
18. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
19. 266 U.S. 1 (1924).
20. Id. at 14.
21. Lisemba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
22. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
23. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 "nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law ..
24. 297 U.S. at 285-86.
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finding that the confession of the accused was voluntary, and admissible as
trustworthy evidence, was not reviewed by the Supreme Court. The case was
brought before it upon the constitutional question of due process, which peti-
tioner had raised in the state court, and not to review the application of
Mississippi law as to the admissibility of 'confessions. The Court in effect
held that, though the confession may have been true, the means by which it
had been obtained and its use in evidence to secure a conviction deprived
the accused of his life and liberty without the due process of law imposed
by the fourteenth amendment.
Subsequently it was held explicitly that whether a confession is involuntary
and hence untrustworthy or whether it is violative of due process and hence
unconstitutional are two distinct issues.25 Of this distinction the Court has
said, "The aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude pre-
sumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use
of evidence, whether true or false.1 26 The Court has not defined this "funda-
mental unfairness" which denies due process. It must be gathered case by case
through a process of factual analysis. In White v. Texas27 a conviction of
rape was reversed because it was based on a confession obtained from the
defendant, an illiterate farmhand, after being held for six or seven days, with-
out the filing of a charge, without benefit of counsel and after being taken
several times to an isolated woods for interrogation. These circumstances, the
Court said, violated due process. In Ward v. Texas28 the confession was
obtained from the defendant after an arrest without a warrant and when, for
a period of several days, he had been taken to strange towns, incarcerated in
several jails and told of possible mob violence against him. Again the use
of the confession was held to violate due process. A divided Court in Haley v.
Ohio, °2 invalidating a confession of a fifteen-year-old boy, considered, among
other factors, the tender years of the accused, his subjection to a prolonged
midnight interrogation by the police, the absence of counsel, and the fact that
he was uninformed of his constitutional rights up to the time he signed the
confession. In this case Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, charac-
terized a "coerced" confession as one which necessarily denies due process
and, on the whole, the opinion reflects the vagueness which is involved in efforts
to formulate principles of "unfairness." 30 Other decisions have held that due
process is violated when a conviction is based upon a confession made when
25. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940). In this' case the issues of fear, threats
and coercion had been submitted to the jury which found these issues against the peti-
tioners, thus finding the confessions voluntary. The Supreme Court, relying on the Brown
case, held that the issue was whether the confessions had been improperly obtained thus
rendering their use in evidence a violation of due process and that the jury's findings
did not preclude the Court on that issue.
26. Lisemba v. California, 314 U.S. 219,, 236 (1941).
27. 310 U.S. 530 (1940).
28. 316 U.S. 547 (1942).
29. 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
30. Id. at 603 (concurring opinion).
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the accused is subjected to prolonged and incessant interrogation,31 when held
incommunicado for ten days,32 and when the accused makes a confession under
the deception of a psychiatrist. 33 To formulate a simple rule from the cases
is impossible. That circumstances which probably would not violate the trust-
worthy test for confessions can violate due process is evident from the fact
that so many convictions upheld by the state courts have been reversed by
the Supreme Court. At the same time it can be argued that circumstances
making a confession untrustworthy will also violate due process at least where
threats, fear or physical or mental duress are involved. Whether a confession
based solely upon hope of reward would violate due process is open to doubt
but it is unlikely that the question will be decided since such a case is not
likely to escape the state court's application of the trustworthy rule.
The McNabb Rule
In 1943 a third and final restriction was imposed by the Supreme Court in
McNabb v. United States.34 This case involved a conviction of murder in a
federal case which was reversed by the Court because the confession upon
which it was based was obtained after a delay in the arraignment of the
accused. Federal officers failed to bring the accused promptly before a magis-
trate as required by federal statute.35 The rationale of the McNabb case was
not immediately clear. Portions of the Court's opinion offered the discourage-
ment of undesirable police practices as its reason, 36 while room was left for
commentators to speculate that delay in arraignment was merely an element
of coercion making the confession inadmissible as untrustworthy or violative
of due process. The view that an otherwise admissible confession would be
excluded solely to discourage certain police tactics was not popular then or
now. That delay in arraignment, in and of itself, was not the basis of the
McNabb decision seemed certain when, in United States v. Mitchell,37 an
attempt to invoke the McNabb rule was rejected by the Court where the
confession was initially and freely given prior to a period of illegal detention.
It was pointed out, however, that to admit the confession was not a case of
allowing the federal officers to enjoy the fruits of their misconduct since the
confession preceded and did not result from the delay in arraignment. 38 Finally
in Upshaw v. United States 9 the Supreme Court unequivocally defined the
McNabb rule as permitting the reversal of a conviction merely because it was
based upon a confession obtained during a delay in arraignment. Within the
narrow limits of this rule the delay itself was sufficient whether it was reason-
able or not.
31. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
32. Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957).
33. Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
34. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
35. Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(a). Formerly 18 U.S.C. § 595 (1940).
36. 318 U.S. at 344.
37. 322 U.S. 65 (1944).
38. Id. at 70.
39. 335 U.S. 410 (1948).
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EFFECT OF THE SuPRE E COURT DocT-n UPON STATE LAW
The threefold doctrine of the Supreme Court, of course, applies in all respects
to federal cases. Not all of the three facets of the doctrine will apply to state
cases.
Tests of voluntariness which the Supreme Court has adopted to determine
the trustworthiness of a confession apply ofily to the federal courts and each
state may adopt such rules for the prosecution of crimes and the admissibility
of evidence as it elects.40 Federal courts are not empowered to determine what
the local rules of admissibility shall be.41
40. Lisemba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
41. Buchalter v. New York, 319 U.S. 427 (1943). Some doubt, however, is cast upon
the future validity of this principle in its Vroadest sense in view of the holding of the
Court in Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1955), In that case federal officers, pro-
ceeding under an invalid federal search warrant, obtained from petitioner evidence of his
possession of narcotics. Petitioner was indicted in the federal district court whereupon
he moved to suppress the evidence obtained under the invalid warrant. The motion was
granted and the indictment dismissed. Thereafter petitioner was indicted in the state court
for illegal possession of narcotics. While his tzia wai pending, he moved in the federal
district court to enjoin the federal officers, from testifying .in the state proceedings and
for an order directing them to recover the evidnficb obtained under the warrant if it had
already been transferred to the state authorities. The district court denied the motion,
- F. Supp. -, aff'd, 218 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1954), cert. granted, 348 U.S. 958 (1955). The
Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision reversed the judgment holdifig that the motion should
be granted.
The majority said, "[W]e have then a case that raises not a constitutional question
but one concerning our supervisory powers over federal law enforcement agencies. Cf.
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332. . . ." 50 U.S. at 217. The majority, therefore,
proceeded upon the principle that the federal rules bind- federal officers and the federal
courts have the right to enforce obedience to these rules by such bfficers. The Court
further said, "The fact that their violation [federal rules] may be condoned by state
practice has no relevancy to our problem." 350 'U.S. at 217.
The dissent took the position that the decision impinged upon the principle recognized
by the Court in the past that "in criminal law enforcement . . . the'Stafes'should be left
free to follow or not the federal exclusionary nle [that vevdence unlawfully obtained is
inadmissible]. . . ." 350 U.S. at 221. The dissent also rejected the' contention of the
majority that this was an exercise of the Court's "supervisory powers" under the McNabb
rule. It was pointed out that McNabb was primarily establishing a rule of evidence for
federal courts and was not concerned with law enforcement practices as such.
It is submitted that this decision severely weakensthe authority of the proposition that
a state may admit and use unlawfully obtained evidence whatever the source. It may
well herald an intrusion by the Supreme Court upon a field which has been traditionally
considered a question of state law only, that is, admissibility of evidence. If the Supreme
Court will enjoin a federal officer from testifying in a state,, court where his testimony
springs from some violation of federal law and will enjoin him from delivering to state
officers any physical evidence obtained as a result of othat violation, is it not safe to assume
that the Court might reverse a state conviction based upon such evidence? If so, then
at least one aspect of the state law as to admissibility will' have been destroyed for the
states could no longer use evidence turned over to them by federal officers where such
evidence had been obtained in violation of federal law. The- states are themselves divided
1958]
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If the constitutional question of due process is raised relative to the circum-
stances surrounding a confession then the Supreme Court may apply its tests
of "fairness" to determine whether a conviction may stand.42 The Court is
not concluded by a jury finding that such a confession was voluntary but will
determine that question itself from the evidence.43 Indeed, in one case a con-
viction has been reversed solely because a state court refused to permit an
accused to raise the due process question after he had previously denied making
any confession at all.
4 4
In a number of decisions the Supreme Court has said that if due process
has been violated by the use of a confession the conviction is reversible re-
gardless of other independent and sufficient evidence upon which the conviction
could stand.45 However, in Stein v. New York 46 it was held that merely
presenting a confession to a jury to decide whether, from the circumstances
surrounding it, the confession was to be ignored did not provide a basis for
reversal. In that case there was sufficient evidence to convict even without
the confession. The opinion pointed out that where there is provision only
for a general verdict there is no way to determine whether the verdict was
based in whole or in part on the questionable confession. The Court said,
"we could hold that such provisional and contingent presentation of the con-
fessions precludes a verdict on the other sufficient evidence after they are
rejected only if we deemed the fourteenth amendment to enact a rigid exclu-
sionary rule of evidence rather than a guarantee against conviction on inher-
ently untrustworthy evidence. ' ' 4 7 The earlier seemingly inconsistent statements
of the Court were declared dicta and reversals of convictions prior to the Stein
case on due process grounds were stated to have occurred only where the con-
fessions were the sole sufficient evidence.
While the Stein case may have mitigated to some extent the due process
aspect of the Supreme Court doctrine it still has a vast effect on state court
decisions. In affirming a conviction which the defendant claims was obtained
in violation of due process a state court necessarily determines that the admis-
sion of the confession did not constitute a denial of due process and thereby
renders its decision reviewable by the Supreme Court.48 Thus state courts will
upon the question but all consider it to be a purely state question. See Annot., 50
A.L.R.2d 531, 575, § 9(d) (1956).
42. Lisemba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
43. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
44. Lee v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 742 (1948).
45. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596,
597 n.1 (1944).
46. 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
47. Id. at 192.
48. White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940). The Court implied that part of the recognized
test of the admissibility of confessions in state courts was whether due process had been
accorded the defendant. It seems odd, if that were a recognized test, that so many state
courts could have been so wrong as to what constituted due process. It is submitted
that the number of reversals occurred precisely because state courts were not applying
a due process test based upon fairness to the defendant but rather the trustworthy test
based upon the credibility of the confession as evidence. The same facts may have been
[Vol. 2 7
have to determine whether a confession conforms to the degree of "fairness"
required by the Supreme Court. People v. Leyra49 is illustrative of this point.
The New York Court of Appeals reversed a conviction based on a confession
obtained under circumstances which were held to be fundamentally unfair
to the accused. On the other hand, as the Supreme Court itself noted, 0 the
rejection of confessions under the due process clause may cause state appellate
courts to give a merely perfunctory review of convictions based upon confes-
sions since the defendants have been adequately protected by the Supreme
Court in the past. It would seem more likely and practical that the states
will conform to the Supreme Court standards and thereby eliminate sure
reversal of costly prosecutions.
The major difficulty with the due process test is that it is so general and
so much a question of fact that the various courts are bound to disagree as
to what facts will constitute a denial of due process in a given case. In
Thomas v. Arizouz51 Justice Clark, writing for the majority in affirming the
conviction, distinguished the case from cases involving incommunicado deten-
tion or intimations of mob violence which the Court had already determined
might render a confession so obtained violative of due process.52 Justice Clark,
however, dissented in Payne v. Arkansas53 in which there was ample evidence
of both intimations of mob violence and incommunicado detention saying, "I
believe that on this record the state courts properly held petitioner's confession
voluntary."5 The main ground of his dissent, it is true, was that there was
other sufficient evidence in the record for conviction.5 5 However the statement
quoted is illustrative of the fact that the due process test becomes, in effect,
a test of the impact of the circumstances surrounding a confession upon the
sense of "fundamental fairness" of the individual judge. It would seem that
only in cases of the most flagrant abuses can general unanimity be expected
in applying the test.
The McNabb Rule and Due Process
The McNabb decision, involving a federal prosecution and predicated upon
a federal statute, is limited to federal courts. It has been held to have no
considered but the emphasis was different. Many of the states permit the jury to deter-
mine the question of whether the confession was voluntary, i.e., trustworthy and the state
courts felt that they were bound by the finding of the jury. See, e.g., Chambers v. Florida,
309 U.S. 227-28 n.2 (1940).
49. 302 N.Y. 353, 98 N.E.2d 553 (1951). It is important to note that the New York
Court of Appeals in this case expressly cited the leading Supreme Court "due process"
cases as controlling. Id. at 364, 98 N.E.2d at 559. The defendant was subsequently
retried without the use of any of the confessions obtained and his conviction was reversed
by the court of appeals on the ground that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the
conviction. 1 N.Y.2d 199, 134 N.E.2d 475, 151 N.Y.S.2d 658 (1956).
go. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 180 (1953).
51. 356 U.S. 390 (1958).
52. Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957).
53. 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
54. Id. at 569 (dissenting opinion).
55. See discussion of the Stein case p. 402 supra.
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application to state cases.56 A confession is not excluded by the fourteenth
amendment merely because it was obtained during an illegal detention. 57 Not-
withstanding these assertions the fact remains that delay in arraignment has
been a factor the Court deemed worthy of emphasis in many reversals of state
convictions on the basis of due process.58 Recently in Fikes v. Alabama5 9 the
Supreme Court reversed a state conviction upon little more than an illegal
detention as the basis for applying the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Even in that case it was admitted that the "flouting of the re-
quirement of prompt arraignment prevailing in most States is in and of itself
not a denial of due process." 60 In theory at least the McNabb rule remains
applicable only to federal cases. 61
PROPOSED LEGISLATION CONCERNING THE McNABB RULE
In Mallory v. United States6 2 the Supreme Court applied the McNabb rule
in reversing a District of Columbia conviction for rape where the delay was
only seven and one-half hours. This decision prompted Congress to consider
legislation to abrogate that rule. The House passed the so-called Mallory Bill
which provided that a 'confession would not be excluded from evidence solely
because it was made during a delay in arraignment. The Senate Judiciary
56. Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951).
57. Ibid.
58. See notes 27-29 supra.
59. 352 U.S. 191 (1957).
60. Id. at 199 n.1 (concurring opinion).
61. The opinions in Fikes v. Alabama, supra notes 59 and 60, however, raise some
doubt as to whether the Court is beginning to "absorb" the McNabb Rule into the due
process test. The Chief Justice, while conceding that a detention in violation of an
Alabama statute does not render a confession inadmissible by the law of that state, makes
the cryptic comment that "nevertheless, such an occurrence is 'relevant circumstantial
evidence in the inquiry as to physical or psychological coercion' Stein v. New York, 346
U.S. 156, 187." 352 U.S. at 194 n.2.
Justices Frankfurter and Brennan, concurring, while stating that undue detention is not
a violation of due process, pointed out "it is to disregard experience not to recognize that
the ordinary motive for such extended failure to arraign is not unrelated to the purpose
of extracting confessions." 352 U.S. at 199 n.1 (concurring opinion).
Justices Harlan, Reed and Burton, dissenting, said the following: "The absence of
arraignment, much as that practice is to be deprecated, loses in significance in light of the
State's representation . . . that this was not an unusual thing in Alabama. As this Court
recognizes, it did not of itself make the confessions inadmissible." 352 U.S. at 200 (dis-
senting opinion). The dissent concluded: "In the absence of anything . . . which 'shocks
the conscience' or does 'more than offend some fastidious squeamishness . . . about combat-
ting crime too energetically,' [citation omitted], I think that due regard for the division
between state and federal functions in the administration of criminal justice requires that
we let Alabama's judgment stand." 352 U.S. at 201 (dissenting opinion). The dissent,
while not forcefully attacking the implications of the majority decision, seems clearly to
fear that an "absorption" of undue detention into due process may be taking place despite
the recognition by the majority that failure to promptly arraign in itself does not violate
due process.
62. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
[Vol. 27
